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QUICK OFF THE MARK? IN FAVOR OF 
EMPOWERING THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 
Nina A. Mendelson* 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States‘s presidential transition period is too long.  Between 
November 7, 2008, and January 20, 2009, the media quickly identified a 
―‗leadership vacuum.‘‖1  In contrast to those of President-elect Obama, 
President Bush‘s approval ratings were at historic lows.2  One reporter 
commented in late November, ―The markets, at least, seem to be listening 
to one [P]resident—and he‘s not the one in the Oval Office,‖3 and another 
noted that ―everyone . . . ignores the actions of the lame duck.‖4   
Meanwhile, President-elect Obama was faced with numerous calls for 
immediate action on the nation‘s pressing economic and national security 
concerns.  A December cover of Time magazine blared, ―Why Obama‘s 
Presidency Has Already Begun . . .,‖5 and Congressman Barney Frank 
commented, ―‗[Obama] says we only have one president at a time. . . .  I‘m 
afraid that overstates the number of presidents we have.  He‘s got to remedy 
that situation.‘‖6  
Despite repeatedly stating that America has ―‗only one [P]resident at a 
time,‘‖7 his care in asserting no formal power, and his avoidance of foreign 





  Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.  Thanks to Chris Kriva for very helpful re-
search assistance and to Jack Beermann, Daniel Halberstam, and Riyaz Kanji for useful discussions. 
1
  Jeff Mason, Mr. Co-President? Obama Upstages Bush on Economy, REUTERS, Nov. 28, 2008, 
available at http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-36698520081125 (quoting Stephen Wayne, a profes-
sor of government at Georgetown University) (link).   
2
  WashingtonPost.com, Washington Post-ABC News Poll of Jan. 13–16, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/postpoll_011709.html (last visited Mar. 22, 
2009) (link). 
3
  See Lisa Lerer, Obama Takes Reins on Econ Crisis, POLITICO, Nov. 26, 2008, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1108/16023.html (link). 
4
  Norman J. Ornstein, Mr. Bush’s Gentlemanly Goodbye, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2009, at A33 (link).   
5
  Massimo Calabresi & Justin Fox, Jump-Starting the Obama Presidency, TIME, Dec. 8, 2008, at 28 
& cover (link to cover).   
6
  Jim Kuhnhenn, Democrats Want a More Assertive Obama, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 4, 2008, 
available at http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D94S8I600&show_article=1 (link).  
7
  Id. 
8
  For example, Obama offered no comment or threat of sanctions or other actions following the ear-
ly January attacks by Israel in the Gaza Strip.  Helene Cooper, Mideast Awaits Signs of Obama’s Stance 
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were President.  On economic matters, he made announcements regarding 
his own massive economic stimulus plan,9 held bipartisan meetings with 
members of Congress, and called for congressional action on economic sti-
mulus measures.10  He described the type of climate change legislation he 
would endorse upon taking office.11  Obama also encouraged President 
Bush to offer financial assistance to the automobile industry, and it is possi-
ble that his statements may have influenced Bush to actually do so12—just 
as with his urgings regarding bailout funds to the financial industry.13  In re-
sponse to questions about his ―much higher profile,‖ Obama publicly com-
mented in November on the importance of the American people knowing 
that ―‗their new [P]resident has a plan and is going to act swiftly and bold-
ly‘ . . . .‖14  In short, Obama‘s preinaugural statements appear to have influ-
enced both government decisionmakers and the general public. 
Most writing about presidential transitions—including some of my 
own—has focused on the problems associated with the outgoing President‘s 
actions, rather than on those of the incoming President-elect.  These writ-
ings reflect the numerous and varied issues surrounding a presidential de-
parture.  Weaknesses in the outgoing President‘s political power may im-
impede his or her ability to take strong action when needed, regardless of 
whether such action is intended to address domestic economic issues or for-
eign policy matters.15  Meanwhile, actions that are taken, such as ―midnight 
rulemaking,‖ hiring into the civil service (especially from the ranks of polit-
ical appointees), and many other decisions, may be seen as overreaching 
and illegitimate.16  They may have broad impacts, may be difficult to re-
verse later, and may be taken notwithstanding the views of the new Presi-
                                                                                                                           
on Gaza, NYTIMES.COM, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/15web-
cooper.html (link).   
9
  See, e.g., Obama Vows Strong New Financial Regulations, REUTERS, Dec. 7, 2008, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN0545867820081207?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNe
ws (link).  
10
  See Peter Baker, On Eve of History, Obama Follows Low-Key Path, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2009, at 
A1 (link); Brian Knowlton, Obama Presses for Action on the Economy, NYTIMES.COM, Jan. 8, 2009,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/us/politics/09transition.html (link).     
11
  Calabresi & Fox, supra note 5, at 28.   
12
  For a general description of the auto industry bailout, see David E. Sanger et al., Bush Aids De-
troit, but Hard Choices Wait for Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, at A1 (link).  
13
  Posting of David M. Herszenhorn to the N.Y. Times The Caucus Blog, Obama to Visit the Hill to 
Ask Democrats to Approve Bailout,  http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/obama-to-visit-the-
hill-to-ask-democrats-to-approve-bailout/ (Jan. 12, 2009, 18:47 EST) (link).    
14
  Brian Knowlton, Obama Vows to Cut Budget Waste, NYTIMES.COM, Nov. 25, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/us/politics/25cnd-transition.html (link).   
15
  See Jack M. Beermann & William P. Marshall, The Constitutional Law of Presidential Transi-
tions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1265 (2006).   
16
  See Jack M. Beermann, Combating Midnight Regulation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 352 
(2009) (link). 
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dent-elect and the electorate.  In my analysis of such actions, I have referred 
to them collectively as ―agency burrowing.‖17   
Bush‘s widely criticized transition activities have included the sale of 
oil and gas leases on land neighboring national parks, limitations on protec-
tions for endangered species associated with approval of federal projects, 
and rules permitting ―factory farms‖ to self-regulate their polluted runoff to 
waterways.18  Indeed, in 2006, when Republicans lost the House and Senate 
at the midterm congressional elections, President Bush‘s press secretary an-
nounced that the President told his staff, ―[P]ut on your track shoes because 
we‘re sprinting to the finish.‖19  Incoming Presidents, including Presidents 
Clinton, Bush, and Obama, have reacted to such actions of the outgoing 
President by holding up pending agency actions.20  In fact, Congressman 
Jerrold Nadler has recently introduced a bill that would bar any rule issued 
within ninety days of inauguration from taking effect until ninety days after 
inauguration.21 
We should now go beyond exploring the legitimacy of ―agency bur-
rowing‖ and examine the mirror-image issue (and a possible response to 
burrowing):  Should a President-elect be empowered to exercise greater au-
thority prior to inauguration?22  This Essay briefly explores two related 
points.  First, policy and legitimacy considerations weigh heavily in favor 
of increasing a President-elect‘s power during the transition period.  
Second, in the absence of a constitutional amendment advancing the date of 
inauguration, statutory amendments increasing a President-elect‘s power 
would be a helpful and feasible way to involve the President-elect in gover-





  See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a 
New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557 (2003).  
18
  See Charlie Savage, Democrats Look for Ways to Undo Late Bush Administration Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at A10 (link); Felicity Barringer, U.S. to Open Public Land Near Parks for Drill-
ing, NYTIMES.COM, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/08/us/08lease.html (link); Intera-
gency Cooperation Under the Endangered Species Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 76272 (Dec. 16, 2008) (to be 
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402) (link).  
19
  See Press Release, White House Office of Communications, Press Gaggle by Tony Snow, Nov. 6, 
2006, available at 2006 WL 3191168, and at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061106.html (link).   
20
  See Memorandum from Leon Panetta for the Heads and Acting Heads of Agencies Described in 
Section 1(d) of Executive Order 12291, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074 (Jan. 25, 1993); Memorandum from Andrew 
H. Card, Jr. for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 
(Jan. 24, 2001) (link); Memorandum from Rahm Emanuel for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies (Jan. 20, 2009), available at http://www.thefederalregister.com/d.p/2009-01-26-E9-1639 
(link). 
21
  See Midnight Rule Act, H.R. 34, 111th Cong. (introduced Jan. 6, 2009) (link). 
22
  Cf. Beermann & Marshall, supra note 15, at 1254 (―During transitions . . . there is no relationship 
between power, accountability, and electoral support that normally hallmarks the democratic process.‖). 
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I. THE ARGUMENT FOR INCREASED PRESIDENT-ELECT POWER 
The arguments from policy and democratic legitimacy to increase the 
President-elect‘s power are strong.  The President-elect has just won a na-
tional election; his claim to democratic legitimacy may be stronger than at 
any later point in the four-year presidential term.  Empowering the Presi-
dent-elect is likely to increase the government‘s responsiveness to the elec-
torate.  Increasing the power of the President-elect could also limit the 
ability of the outgoing President to implement his political agenda in disre-
gard of electoral preferences.23  It might even reduce cynicism among voters 
by reducing the extent to which ―politics as usual‖ constricts the expression 
of their electoral views.24  And, as the most recent transition period has sug-
gested, the leaders of America‘s counterparts abroad are also generally an-
xious to begin conversations with the incoming President.   
In opposition to the arguments for increased power for the President-
elect, it might be argued that voters choose a President to take office on the 
constitutionally-specified date of January 20, not before.  Thus, the sitting 
President ―enjoys an electoral mandate for the full four-year period.‖25  
Surely, only the cave-dwelling American voter would not know that the 
date of inauguration is January 20.  That does not mean, however, that vot-
ers prefer that a new President take office no earlier than January 20.  A 
voter is asked to select only a new President, not the date on which the out-
going President will have to depart. 
It is likewise irrelevant that earlier presidential candidates were elected 
to four-year terms beginning on January 20.  Defending that position im-
plies that nearly any prize flowing from electoral victory is democratically 
legitimate so long as every electing majority gets the same reward.  But this 
view cannot be correct.  For example, we would surely look askance at a 
year-long delay between election and inauguration, even if the same condi-
tion applied to every other electing majority.26  As it stands, America‘s 
three-month presidential transition period is comparatively long.27  In 





  Beermann and Marshall also have suggested that constitutional principles might constrain an out-
going president to ensure an orderly transition that is largely helpful to the President-elect.  Id. at 1256 
(citing the Term, Take Care, and Oath clauses of the Constitution). 
24
  Mendelson, supra note 17, at 564–65.   
25
  Beermann & Marshall, supra note 15, at 1285.  Beermann and Marshall accordingly argue that 
―midnight regulation‖ is ―not constitutionally problematic.‖  Id. at 1288.  
26
  I discussed this argument in Mendelson, supra note 17, at 565 n.34.   
27
  See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION 
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 100 (2006) (observing that every country 
to have written a constitution since World War II has chosen a shorter transition period than the United 
States); Nancy Amoury Combs, Carter, Reagan, and Khomeini: Presidential Transitions and Interna-
tional Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 303, 329 (2001) (noting that post-election governmental transitions else-
where are generally shorter than in the United States).  
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rand took eleven days.‖28  As I have argued elsewhere, this argument, based 
on an equal reward to each electing majority, ―fails to attach significant ex-
pressive value to an infrequent, concerted electoral action.‖29  Only prag-
matic concerns might push in the other direction; a sound reason for a 
presidential transition period is that it enables the President-elect to assem-
ble enough staff to begin operating the government.30   
Despite the weight of the policy arguments, the Constitution‘s text 
precludes a President-elect from unilaterally ejecting the sitting President.  
Article II, Section 1 vests executive power in ―a President.‖31  Further, by 
specifying a date and time at which one President‘s term ends and the suc-
cessor‘s begins, the Twentieth Amendment clearly contemplates that two 
Presidents will not serve simultaneously.32  Moreover, the Framers may 
have wished to avoid an executive branch that would be governed by com-
mittee.33  Thus, President-elect Obama could not have appeared at the White 
House on November 8 seeking to eject President Bush, appoint judges, or 
veto a bill. 
The most straightforward way to shorten the transition period without 
raising legitimacy concerns would be to amend the Constitution so that In-
auguration Day takes place on December 1, or even November 20, as at 
least one proposed constitutional amendment has provided.34  It is fair to 
say, however, that new constitutional amendments face substantial proce-
dural and political obstacles.35  It accordingly is worth exploring other op-
portunities to formalize a greater role for the President-elect, particularly 
with respect to significant administrative agency actions.   
II. THREE POSSIBILITIES FOR INCREASING THE PRESIDENT-ELECT‘S 
POWER DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD 
The Twentieth Amendment is likely the most significant (though not 
the only) obstacle to a proposal that would significantly empower the Presi-
dent-elect.  As I discuss further below, however, there are reasonably strong 
arguments that the Amendment‘s language does not preclude a moderate 





  ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 323 (Mariner Books 1999).   
29
  Mendelson, supra note 17, at 565 n.34. 
30
  See, e.g., Beermann & Marshall, supra note 15, at 1268. 
31
  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added) (link).   
32
  See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1 (link).   
33
  See David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power 8 (Feb. 9, 2009) (un-
published manuscript, on file with SSRN at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1339892) (link).   
34
  See 131 Cong. Rec. 11886 (1985) (statement of Sen. Mathias).   
35
  E.g., Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis 
of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 111–13 (1993) (noting that consti-
tutional amendments are even rarer than one might expect given the ―significant obstacles placed in the 
way of those seeking constitutional change‖). 
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underlying purposes.36  This Essay is meant to initiate a discussion about 
empowering the President-elect by considering three simple possibilities: 
voluntary collaboration, required concurrence in presidential decisions, and 
required concurrence in administrative agency decisions.  This hardly ex-
hausts the range of options, but it does represent a good starting point for 
future proposals. 
A. Voluntary Collaboration 
The easiest case: the sitting President chooses to open the door to the 
President-elect.  Suppose President Bush, for example, had invited Presi-
dent-elect Obama to consult on important policy matters and had refrained 
from making any significant policy decisions without first obtaining Ob-
ama‘s agreement.  Because a President can obtain counsel from outside ad-
visers (including private citizens), this method would surely be constitu-
constitutionally permissible.37 
B. Required Participation at the Presidential Level 
At the other end of the continuum, Congress is probably precluded 
from requiring a sitting President to obtain consent from a President-elect 
before he acts.  For example, Congress presumably could not condition a 
purely presidential decision, such as the issuance of an Executive Order, on 
concurrence from the President-elect.  The problem here is not empowering 
the President-elect, but instead requiring a sitting President to obtain con-
sent from anyone at all.  Such a proposal would trench significantly on the 
President‘s autonomy, and, in the words of the Supreme Court, would 
create the ―risk of control [or] interference . . . by other branches‖ in the 





  See infra Part III. 
37
  An issue might remain regarding whether advisory committee requirements would apply to such 
consultation; if so, they might deter full and frank discussion between the President and President-elect.  
Congress has imposed disclosure and public meeting requirements under the Federal Advisory Commit-
tee Act of 1972, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2006) (―FACA‖).  Such obligations might, however, infringe 
upon the President‘s ability to carry out his constitutional functions—including his duty to make rec-
ommendations to Congress—and courts have accordingly construed the statute narrowly to avoid the 
constitutional question.  Michael J. Mongan, Note, Fixing FACA: The Case for Exempting Presidential 
Advisory Committees from Judicial Review Under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 895, 906, 909 (2005).  That issue is beyond the scope of this article, but it is fair to say that the ar-
guments against required disclosure of this sort of consultation, either because it would not be covered 
by FACA or because it would infringe on the president‘s constitutional prerogatives, are likely to be 
very strong.  See id. at 906–07; Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee 
Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 473 (1997) (stating that consultation with a single 
individual is not consultation with a ―group‖ and thus is not covered by FACA).  See also Ass‘n of Am. 
Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 904–05 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that FACA did 
not cover a health care task force that included the first lady because she received appropriated funds 
and was authorized to perform the duties of the office).   
38
  Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 761 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring).   
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show an ―overriding need to promote objectives within [its] constitutional 
authority‖ to justify such a disruption.39   
Given the outcome of the recent election and the prospect of midnight 
rulemaking and similar actions, advocates of such a proposal could argue 
that it is justified by the need to have an executive branch that is appro-
priately responsive to voters.  The burden of having to show that an objec-
tive is ―overriding,‖ however, would be difficult to overcome given the 
level of interference with the President‘s direct responsibilities.  Similarly, 
presidential disclosure requirements might face separation of powers chal-
lenges or be defeated by assertions of executive privilege.40  In addition, 
such a proposal might face Twentieth Amendment objections, which are 
discussed in greater detail below. 
C. President-Elect Concurrence in Significant Agency Decisions 
Requiring the participation of the President-elect in significant agency 
decisions is the most promising proposal for empowering the President-
elect.  As agencies are entrusted by statute with a wide range of important 
government decisions, this proposal could have significant effects.  At the 
same time, the case for the legality of such a proposal is likely to be strong-
er than a proposal requiring the sitting President to obtain concurrence from 
the President-elect for individual actions.  For example, suppose that Con-
gress barred any executive branch agency from promulgating a significant 
final rule during the presidential transition period unless the agency ob-
tained the concurrence of the President-elect or her designate.  Similar pro-
visions could be imposed for the approval of any significant lease, grant, or 
contract.  For the sake of discussion, I do not envision a system in which 
designates of the President-elect write rules, or propose grant, loan, or lease 
terms.  The agency would still do that, subject to the supervision of the sit-
ting President.  Concurrence of the President-elect or her designate would 
simply be a precondition to the agency finalizing its decision. 
By increasing the participation of the President-elect‘s team during the 
transition period, such a proposal could make the executive branch more 
democratically responsive and accountable to the electorate.  It would also 
limit the prospect of ―midnight rulemaking‖ that is contrary to the prefe-
rences of the incoming President and the voters.  Ideally, it would increase 
the extent to which executive power is exercised in a democratically legiti-
mate way.  The only practical downside of the proposal is that it would re-
quire the President-elect and his transition staff to learn about policy issues 
more quickly so that a concurrence decision for a particular rule or decision 
could be prompt.  
The focus of the concurrence proposal is domestic policy.  Foreign pol-





  Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).  
40
  See supra note 37. 
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policy, harm that may be very difficult for the new President to undo.  This 
is especially so because ―[a]brupt changes in foreign policy can do great 
damage to the country‘s ability to advance its interests internationally.‖41  
Meanwhile, other countries look to the President-elect nearly immediately 
for leadership.  And there is no accountability for the lame-duck actions of 
the outgoing President, as the electorate has already thrown its weight be-
hind a new commander-in-chief.  Consequently, the need to constrain an 
outgoing President from doing damage in the foreign policy arena may be 
substantial. 
Unfortunately, the legal obstacles to formally empowering a President-
elect in this area are likewise substantial.  As a matter of constitutional law 
and tradition, the President is the ―representative of the United States with 
respect to external affairs.‖42  Despite the damage that a lame-duck Presi-
dent could do, a transition period system that generates any ambiguity about 
who is the head of state could create even greater difficulties for conducting 
international affairs.  As Professors Beermann and Marshall have stated, 
―[d]ealings with foreign nations are not possible without a single authorita-
tive voice.‖43  Beyond these pragmatic difficulties, a regime in which the 
outgoing President must obtain the President-elect‘s concurrence on foreign 
policy matters is unlikely to pass muster under the Court‘s current separa-
tion of powers doctrine.  Even apart from Twentieth Amendment issues, 
courts are likely to find impermissible interference with the President‘s 
unique authority over foreign affairs.44 
As a consequence, we might have to settle for something less than 
President-elect concurrence in the foreign policy arena.  Congress might re-
quire that the President consult with the President-elect on foreign policy 
matters.  Presidents have made some effort to engage in such consultation 
already, and perhaps they should see themselves as duty-bound to do so.45  





  Beermann & Marshall, supra note 15, at 1281. 
42
  Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (per curiam), vacated on other 
grounds by 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (per curiam) (link).  See American Ins. Ass‘n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 
396, 414–15 (2003) (link); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (link); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 
(1936) (stating that ―the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the na-
tion‖ in the ―vast external realm‖) (link).     
43
  Beermann & Marshall, supra note 15, at 1281.   
44
  See, e.g., ARC Ecology v. U.S. Dep‘t of the Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2005) (con-
cluding that requiring the President to ―undertake . . . cleanups on foreign soil absent some agreement 
with the foreign government . . . would impermissibly encroach on the Executive‘s foreign affairs au-
thority‖) (link); Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a statute 
requiring the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with foreign nations ―impinges upon power ex-
clusively granted to the Executive Branch under the Constitution‖) (link).  
45
  See Beermann & Marshall, supra note 15, at 1282. 
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ally avoided ―controversial international issues‖ or have consulted with 
their successors regarding the proper ―course to pursue.‖46 
III. LEGAL OBJECTIONS TO A PRESIDENT-ELECT CONCURRENCE 
REQUIREMENT FOR AGENCY ACTIONS 
In the domestic arena, the legal case for giving the President-elect a 
more formal role in agency decisions is fairly strong.  A concurrence re-
quirement for significant agency actions would interfere far less with au-
thority allocated to the President than would requiring concurrence for 
presidential decisions.  Congress is clearly able to limit an agency‘s activi-
ty, including by limiting the scope of a statutory program or imposing pro-
cedural requirements; Congress thus could impose a concurrence 
requirement.  The biggest constitutional difficulty an agency-concurrence 
proposal would face stems from the Twentieth Amendment.  This section 
outlines that issue and then briefly surveys other possible constitutional ob-
jections. 
A. The Twentieth Amendment 
The language of the Twentieth Amendment provides that ―[t]he terms 
of the President and the Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of 
January . . . and the terms of their successors shall then begin.‖47  Adding a 
President-elect concurrence requirement would augment the President-
elect‘s power and reduce that of the President.  By giving her such addi-
tional power, the argument might be made that the President-elect‘s term 
has effectively started earlier than January 20.   
On the other hand, there may be strong functionalist, purpose-based re-
joinders.  For example, one could argue that because the sitting President 
and the executive agencies would retain all power to initiate and design the 
structure of agency policies, the President-elect‘s term has not meaningfully 
begun.  The sitting President would likewise retain sole power to interact 
with the other branches; only the President can veto legislation or appoint 
individuals to the federal bench.  Rather than representing an earlier start to 
the presidential term, the concurrence function of the President-elect or her 
designates might be seen as one of many preconditions to agency action.  
The concurrence requirement likely would make a significant difference on-
ly to controversial policy decisions.  Moreover, compared with, say, pro-
posals to halt transition-period rulemaking activity altogether, this plan 
would facilitate a smoother presidential transition.  Immediately after the 
election, the President-elect would be motivated to serve the public interest 
and she, unlike the outgoing President, would remain electorally accounta-





  Combs, supra note 27, at 305.   
47
  U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.   
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Moreover, the agency-concurrence plan should be seen as consistent 
with the Amendment‘s spirit.  The purpose of the Twentieth Amendment 
was not to give the lame-duck President an entitlement to some specified 
time in office.  Instead, it was meant to shorten the transition period be-
tween election and inauguration.  As John Copeland Nagle has so effective-
ly described in his essay on the Twentieth Amendment and lame-duck 
Congresses, the Amendment‘s purpose was not to limit, but to increase, the 
responsiveness of government to the people‘s will as expressed through the 
election.48  By eliminating the lame-duck Congress49 and shortening both 
the presidential and legislative transition periods, it was to make ―the voice 
of the people in an election . . . supreme.‖50  The sponsor of a subsequent 
proposed constitutional amendment to inaugurate the President and Vice 
President on November 20 emphasized the need to have ―[t]he people‘s de-
cision . . . implemented as soon as possible.‖51  A concurrence requirement 
for significant agency decisions would clearly be consistent with that pur-
pose.  
Although the Twentieth Amendment, on its face, does provide a transi-
tion period of significant length, only a limited inference about the 
Amendment‘s purpose should be drawn from the date its drafters chose.  
Implicit in the Amendment is an attempt to balance democratic goals, such 
as having the country‘s leadership positions held by election winners as 
soon as possible, against pragmatic considerations, such as the need for an 
orderly transition and time for the President-elect to arrive with her house-
hold in Washington.  Modernized transportation methods have shortened 
the time needed for the latter.  Other practical obstacles to an immediate 
transition may still remain; electoral campaigns require considerable per-
sonal and financial resources, and the need for such resources competes 
with the need for pre-election transition planning.  Moreover, the Electoral 





  See John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 470, 480 (1997). 
49
  Prior to the Twentieth Amendment, owing to idiosyncrasies in scheduling congressional sessions, 
thirteen months (or longer) might elapse between the date members of Congress were elected and the 
date they took office.  During this time, a short session of the lame-duck Congress was usually called.  
Id. at 484–85. 
50
  Id. at 480.  Despite Beermann‘s and Marshall‘s suggestion that the Twentieth Amendment was 
not clearly aimed at lame-duck presidential activity because inauguration of the new president is not set 
until seventeen days after the new Congress arrives, the reason for this delay was not to preserve a lame-
duck presidency, but to avoid having a lame-duck House of Representatives be the institution set to re-
solve a presidential election if no candidate received a majority in the Electoral College.  See U.S. 
CONST. amend. XII (link). 
51
  See 131 CONG. REC. 11886 (1985) (statement of Sen. Mathias).  The Twentieth Amendment had 
to be an amendment to the Constitution only because it (briefly) had the effect of shortening congres-
sional and presidential terms from their constitutionally prescribed lengths.  See S. REP. NO. 72-26, at 5–
6 (1932).   
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though its schedule could be shortened by statute if needed.52  But apart 
from these practical issues, it is unclear whether any valid reasons remain 
for leaving power in the hands of departing incumbents.  None of these 
practical considerations weighs against imposing a President-elect concur-
rence requirement upon agency officials. 
B. The Appointments Clause and Other Concerns 
The delegation of concurrence authority to an elected individual not al-
ready holding his or her executive position raises additional legal questions.  
Delegations of regulatory power to private individuals have sometimes 
been successfully challenged on due process grounds—in part because of 
concerns that the private party may be motivated by selfish interests that 
could be adverse to those of the regulated party and in part because of con-
cerns that the private party may be able to readily exercise power in an arbi-
trary fashion.  For example, in the New Deal case Carter v. Carter Coal 
Co., the Supreme Court invalidated on due process grounds a regulatory 
scheme that institutionalized the decisions of two-thirds of a district‘s coal 
producers in the form of rules binding on the other third.53  In the present in-
stance, however, no similar criticism can be leveled against the President-
elect, who has every incentive to pursue the public interest.  Although he 
has not yet formally assumed his position, the President-elect is in a situa-
tion far closer to that of a public official than to that of a private individual 
because of the means of his selection and his ultimate electoral accountabil-
ity.  Consequently, giving the President-elect concurrence authority seems 
less likely to offend the Due Process Clause than do other schemes in which 
Congress has delegated significant authority outside the executive branch. 
The Appointments Clause, which provides the proper means of ap-
pointing government ―Officers,‖54 may also present no obstacle.  Courts 
have so far declined to hold that simply taking action relating to the gov-
ernment makes an individual a federal officer for purposes of the Appoint-





  By congressional statute, the Electoral College currently meets the first Monday after the second 
Wednesday in December.  3 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (link).  
53
  298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (link); see Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 144 (1912) 
(link).   
54
  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (link).   
55
  See, e.g., Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 326–27 (1890) (link) (holding that a merchant ap-
praiser who could issue binding valuations of dutiable goods was not an ―officer‖); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 125–26 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879)) 
(―We think that the term ‗Officers of the United States‘ . . . defined to include ‗all persons who can be 
said to hold an office under the government‘ . . . is a term intended to have substantive meaning.‖) 
(link).  In Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (link), the Court struck down the Brady Handgun 
Violence Prevention Act on the grounds that it commandeered state officials.  Justice Scalia, writing for 
the majority, stated in dicta that all executive branch functions were to be performed by officers selected 
by the President (or by inferior officers, appointed as the Constitution provides) so as to ensure ―mea-
ningful Presidential control.‖  Id. at 922.  Commentators and later courts have distinguished this lan-
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President-elect prior to making a significant decision would not thereby 
give the President-elect an ―office‖ or make that individual an ―officer.‖  
The President-elect would not ―exercise significant discretion‖56 or have the 
―power to bind the government.‖57  The argument would be that the Presi-
dent-elect‘s concurrence is a simple precondition to federal agency action, 
much like other preconditions Congress has imposed.   
For example, courts have upheld provisions of the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act that require state gubernatorial concurrence as a condition 
of federal authorization to Native American tribes who want to operate ca-
sinos.58  Despite the concurrence precondition, the courts viewed the author-
ity to implement the Act, including the ability to initiate an action and to 
define its scope, as residing with a duly-appointed federal official.  In the 
transition case described here, plausible arguments also could be made that 
the President-elect‘s functions would not make him an officer in the consti-
tutional sense.  Agency officials would continue to possess the authority to 
define the outlines of a rule, for example, and to finally decide whether to 
issue that binding rule once all preconditions had been satisfied.  Requiring 
concurrence from the President-elect is thus not part of the core authority to 
implement the statute.  Instead, concurrence simply represents an additional 
condition on the exercise of executive authority. 
For the same reason, such a scheme also is not likely to raise signifi-
cant separation of powers concerns.  Despite the concurrence requirement, 
agency officials would still possess the core authority, under the relevant 
statutes, to carry out the laws.59  Moreover, there is no issue of congression-
al aggrandizement because Congress would obtain no new authority or in-
fluence by imposing a statutory concurrence requirement.60 
                                                                                                                           
guage, however, because the act at issue in Printz relied primarily on state officials for implementation.  
See, e.g., Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wis. v. United States, 367 
F.3d 650, 658 (7th Cir. 2004) (link) (concluding that a state gubernatorial concurrence requirement was 
not ―execution‖ within the meaning of Printz); Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globali-
zation: Separation of Powers Limits on Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-
Federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 331, 375–86 (1998) (arguing that the Printz dictum is inconsistent 
with well-established doctrine and practice). 
56
  Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991) (link).   
57
  Proposed Commission on Deregulation of International Ocean Shipping, 7 Op. Off. Legal Coun-
sel 202, 202–03 (1983).   
58
  See Lac Courte Oreilles, 367 F.3d 650; Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. v. United 
States, 110 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1997) (link). 
59
  Nor does this create a novel issue with the language in Article II, Section 1 vesting the executive 
power in the President.  Congress has already vested significant authority in the heads of agencies, and 
even with a concurrence requirement, the core executive authority for implementing those statutes 
would remain with the agencies.   
60
  Similarly, there would appear to be little argument that Congress would be improperly delegating 
its own authority.  See, e.g., Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939) (link). 
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CONCLUSION 
In short, a requirement that an agency obtain the concurrence of the 
President-elect or her designate for a significant transition period action 
may well be feasible, and it would surely increase the electoral accounta-
bility of the executive branch.  Future work might include assessing options 
with greater involvement by the President-elect in setting the domestic 
agenda or making foreign policy decisions.  At a minimum, further discus-
sion on empowering the President-elect is worthwhile.  It may be that 
changes to the law—short of a constitutional amendment—would signifi-
cantly increase the extent to which the executive branch is accountable to 
the electorate after one of the electorate‘s rare concerted expressions.   
 
 
